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Abstract
We introduce a method for the assessment of trust for n-open systems based on a measurement of ﬁdelity and present a prototypical
implementation of a complaint architecture. We construct a MAPE loop which monitors the compliance between corresponding
ﬁgures of interest in cyber- and physical domains; derive measures of the system’s trustworthiness; and use them to plan and
execute actions aiming at guaranteeing system safety and resilience. We conclude with a view on our future work.
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1. Introduction
Fidelity of an open system can be interpreted as the compliance between corresponding ﬁgures of interest in
two separate but communicating domains, see1. In cyber-physical systems, perfect ﬁdelity means that actions in
the physical domain have a well-deﬁned and stable counterpart in the cyber domain, and vice-versa. This is an
ideal state, as no concrete cyber-physical system may guarantee at all times a perfect correspondence between its
domains of action. In practice, ﬁdelity is aﬀected by circumstances that let the system drift from the optimal case.
Our stance is that, by observing the characteristics of said drifting, we may introduce a ﬁne-grained characterisation
of the quality of system trustworthiness. To this aim, we introduce a practical method for the assessment of trust
based on the measurement of ﬁdelity in computational systems, including cyber-physical ones. As a way to measure
ﬁdelity drifting we propose to adopt and extend the approach described in2,3. We propose to make use of the accrued
information to assess the characteristics of drifting in ﬁdelity; we derive from it dynamic properties of both user and
machine; evaluate it in terms of system’s trustworthiness and use it to execute safety-assurance actions. This generates
a trust-induced MAPE-loop.
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The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we describe the conceptual model of system ﬁdelity; in Sect. 3 the
model for ﬁdelity evaluation is implemented in an architecture for a cyber-physical system; in Sect. 4 we build the
link to trustworthiness evaluation; ﬁnally, in Sect. 5 we conclude by drawing some observation and describing further
lines of research.
2. Conceptual understanding of System Fidelity
In the present section we introduce a conceptual model of system ﬁdelity, derived from the one presented in1. Our
starting point is the concept of n-open systems (nOPS), characterised by the following properties:
• nOPS interact with one or more of the environments they are deployed in.
• nOPS base their action on the ability to sense n classes of raw facts taking place in their deployment environ-
ments.
• nOPS are able to construct and maintain n classes of internal representations of the raw facts, called qualia.
• Qualia are, to some extent, faithful, meaning that they timely reﬂect the dynamic variation of the corresponding
class of raw facts.
We discuss here ﬁdelity as a characterisation of the above-mentioned faithfulness. More formally, given any S ∈
nOPS, we consider n classes of raw facts, [r]i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and n classes of binary operations, []i, such that each of
the couples
([r]i, []i) (1)
constitutes an algebraic structure; for instance, when []i is a singleton, then ([r]i, []i) is a group. Likewise, for any
1 ≤ i ≤ n, we call [q]i the class of qualia corresponding to [r]i and [⊕]i the class of binary operations corresponding
to []i. Moreover, as we did for (1), we assume that ([q]i, [⊕]i) is an algebraic structure. Then, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we
consider the following function:
Φi : [r]i → [q]i, (2)
mapping the qualia corresponding to any raw fact in [r]i. We refer to the Φi functions as the reﬂective maps of some
n-open system S . Reﬂective maps are assumed to be bijective functions, with Φ−1i being the inverted reﬂective maps
of S associating the raw fact corresponding to each input quale. We shall say thatΦi expresses perfect ﬁdelity between
([r]i, []i) and ([q]i, [⊕]i) if and only ifΦi preserves its algebraic structures (i.e., it is an isomorphism). More formally,
for any couple of raw facts (r1, r2) ∈ [r]i × [r]i and for all + ∈ []i and all · ∈ [⊕]i: Φi(r1 + r2) = Φi(r1) · Φi(r2).
Perfect ﬁdelity may be better understood through an example. Let us assume that S is a cyber-physical system
responsible for the operation of a mission critical hard-real-time service. An operator is responsible for the issuing
of requests for service, which is done through a user interface (UI). A set of raw facts and prescribed behaviours
pertaining to the physical environment are represented as “cyber-qualia” and “cyber-behaviours” stored in computer
memories. Likewise, a set of “UI-qualia” and “UI-behaviours” are respectively rendered and operable through the UI.
Perfect ﬁdelity states that the correspondence between the physical, the cyber, and the UI domains is such that the
prescribed behaviours as well as the referred raw facts and qualia are consistent on either of the involved domains.
Thus certain operations and objects represented and rendered via the UI perfectly correspond to operations and objects
encoded in S ’s computer components, which in turn perfectly correspond to physical actions having eﬀects on physical
entities. Obviously, perfect ﬁdelity only represents a reference point and can not be sustained and guaranteed at all
times in real life. A slightly diﬀerent and more practical deﬁnition of ﬁdelity is given by a function φi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
φi : [r]i → [q]i, such that ∀+ ∈ []i,∀ · ∈ [⊕]i : φi(r1 + r2) = φi(r1) · φi(r2) · Δi(t). (3)
As for the Φi function, φi returns the qualia associated with the input raw facts. Contrarily to the Φi function, the φi
does not preserve their algebraic structures unless the value of the error component Δi(t) is zero. The use of lower-
case “φ” is meant to suggest that φi represents a less-than-perfect version of Φi. The Δi(t) quantiﬁes a drifting in time
(represented by variable t) of the ability to create a trustworthy “internal” representation of an experienced raw fact.
In1, ﬁdelity is classiﬁed in function of the type of drifting. Classes may include, e.g., the following cases:
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• Hard-bound ﬁdelity drifting, exempliﬁed by hard-real-time nOPS.
• Statistically-bound ﬁdelity drifting—as typical of, e.g., soft real-time systems.
• Unbound ﬁdelity drifting characterised by a “trend”.
• Unbound ﬁdelity drifting with a random trend.
Accordingly, very disparate cases can be presented to exemplify imperfect ﬁdelity, e.g. the accidents experienced
by the linear accelerator Therac-254,5 and the system failure caused by the last Scud ﬁred during the Gulf War6. In
the former case, one of the reasons that led to some of the accidents was that the UI-qualia and the cyber-qualia did
not match when the operator was typing at a very fast pace. As a result of such imperfect ﬁdelity, the quantities
represented on the screen of the Therac-25 did not correspond to the data stored in its memories—and, regrettably,
to the amount of radiations supplied to the patients by the linear accelerator. In the Patriot case, resulting in 28 US
Army reservists being killed and 97 injured by a Scud missile on 25 February 1991. The missile-defence system was
an nOPS that interacted with its environment through a number of context ﬁgures that included velocity and time.
As discussed in7, the cyber-quale corresponding to physical time was represented as the number of tenths of seconds
from a reference epoch and stored in a 24-bit integer variable. Imprecision in the conversion of said variable into a real
number translated in an unbound drifting of ﬁdelity over time. The more the Patriot missile-defence system operated
without a reboot, the larger was the Δi pertaining to time and, as a consequence, the greater the discrepancy between
the expected and the real position and velocity of the incoming Scud missile. An obvious workaround to the above
unbound drifting is that of rebooting the system regularly so as to rejuvenate8 the qualia management system and
bring back the Δi to “safe” values. Although both problem and workaround were known at the time of the accident,
no upper bound was known beyond which the resilience of the system would be aﬀected. Common belief was that
the unresilience threshold would never be reached in practice. Regrettably, reality proved the trust on that belief to be
misplaced. The Patriot missile that had to intercept the Scud never took oﬀ. The cases of the Therac-25 and of the
Patriot system reveal a common denominator: behaviours such as those of a human operator or those produced by a
numerical algorithm are all translated into a same, homogeneous form: that of a stream of numerical data representing
samples of the Δi(t) dynamic systems. A major methodological assumption in the present work is that the above data
could be compared with other data representing reference conditions. In the Therac-25 case, such data may correspond
to, e.g., reference user stereotypes of expected operator behaviours, represented for instance as the numerical weights
in a Hidden Markov Model13. Likewise, in the Patriot case, those reference data may correspond to, e.g., a threshold
representing safe ranges for accumulated or cumulative numerical errors produced through the iterations of numerical
methods. In both the exempliﬁed cases, assessing ﬁdelity is thus translated into the problem of evaluating a “distance”
between observed and reference data.
In what follows, we propose an architecture and a prototypical system to evaluate systematically a system’s ﬁ-
delity drifting. These are modelled on a toy example, easily modiﬁed and extended to a real case scenario, whose
presentation we reserve to an extended version of this work.
3. Janus’ Architecture
In view of the above discussion, our approach to systematic evaluation of ﬁdelity requires at least the following
components:
• A sensory service, interfacing the deployment environments so as to register a number of “raw facts”, namely
variations in a number of environmental properties. Raw facts could refer, for instance, to variations in lumi-
nosity, temperature, or the amount of network bandwidth available between two endpoints.
• A uniform qualia service, providing consistent, timely and reliable access to cyber-qualia (computer-based
representations of the raw facts).
• An application layer, providing a convenient means for ﬁdelity assessment and reactive control.
In what follows we introduce the above components and a prototypical system compliant to the just sketched models,
see Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. Sequence diagram of the Janus’ components.
3.1. Sensory and Qualia Services
Our sensory and qualia service is based on so-called reﬂective and refractive variables (RRvars)10,11, a tool for the
development of nOPS in the C programming language. The idea behind RRvars is quite simple: a number of prede-
ﬁned variables provide access to the qualia of corresponding raw facts. Those variables are “volatile”, meaning that
their content is asynchronously and continuously updated by an associated thread. Thus for instance RRvar int cpu
does not retain a constant value; rather, it is continuously updated by the Cpu() thread. Such thread cyclically re-
trieves the percentage of CPU currently in use and stores it in the memory cells associated to cpu as an integer number
ranging between 0 (CPU fully available) and 100 (no CPU available). In the current implementation, which runs on
Linux and Windows/Cygwin systems, Cpu() retrieves its raw facts by calling the top utility. This is referred to as
process1b in Fig. 1.
A second and slightly more complex example is given by RRvar int mplayer, a variable updated by thread
Mplayer(), referred to as process2b in Fig. 1. The latter component communicates with an instrumented MPlayer
movie player12 through a simple UDP client/server protocol. By reading the content of mplayer one is informed of
the state of the MPlayer—see Fig. 3. Currently, the following integer values are used:
#define UDPMSG_STOP 1 // mplayer has finished playing a video
#define UDPMSG_SLOW 2 // mplayer is encountering problems while playing a video
#define UDPMSG_PAUSED 3 // mplayer has been paused
#define UDPMSG_START 4 // mplayer has been launched
#define UDPMSG_SIGNAL 5 // mplayer caught an exception and is about to exit abnormally.
A third case is given by RRvar int ui, updated by thread Ui(). This is a special case in that this RRvar repre-
sents a UI-qualia (see Sect. 2) reporting raw facts speciﬁc of an instance of a user interface. This is referred to as
process3b–process3e in Fig. 1. Said user interface and the Ui() thread communicate transparently of the operator
via the same mechanism presented for RRvar mplayer. The values returned in RRvar int ui represent usability raw
facts derived by comparing the behaviours exercised by the current user with “reference behaviours” representing the
expected behavioural patterns of a trustworthy operator. The method to derive these raw facts is described in2,13. This
method may be used to detect gradual behavioural driftings (due to, e.g., fatigue, stress, or the assumption of psy-
chotropic substances) and sudden behavioural driftings (caused, e.g., by an account takeover or other cyber-criminal
attacks).
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Fig. 2. Typical structure of an RRvar client. Here three RRvars (cpu, mplayer, and ui) are declared and continuously displayed.
Fig. 3. An instance of the MPlayer connects with Janus and reports its state.
3.2. Control Layer: Janus
Janus is the name of our exemplary RRvar client component.2 The structure of Janus is the one typical of RRvar
clients11 and exempliﬁed in Fig. 2. As can be seen from the picture, the RRvar metaphor makes it possible to quickly
deﬁne nOPS components based on the three classes of qualia presented above, see Fig. 4.
4. Fidelity as Trustworthiness
In this ﬁnal section, we link the model of open systems oﬀered in Sect. 2, and their architecture implemented in
Sect. 3, to a model of trustworthiness evaluation. We use ﬁdelity to assess the working conditions of an open system
and to establish a metric of trustworthiness. Our ﬁnal objective is to provide a qualitative extension of the standard
MAPE-loop based on trustworthiness assessment. Trust for security, management and reputation systems is gaining a
lot of attention in the literature and it is typically accounted for as a ﬁrst-order relation between (possibly autonomous)
agents or system’s modules, see e.g.16,17,18,19,20. Our account considers trust as a second order property characterising
cumulatively system’s ﬁdelity, where the latter is obtained as the dynamic variation of properties of the system’s
modules. This approach to second-order trust has been already used for information transmission evaluations (21),
access-based control (22), and software management systems (23). In the present analysis, trustworthiness is used to
plan reaction to malfunctioning and restoring of functionalities in cyber-physical systems. As the cases of Therac-
2 As for the system described in 14, the name of our component comes from mythical Janus Bifrons, the god of transitions, who had two faces and
thus could observe and reason by considering two diﬀerent “views” at the same time. Of the proposed etymologies of Janus, particularly intriguing
here is the one proposed by Paul the Deacon15: hiantem, hiare, “to be open”. Due to this fact one would be tempted to refer to Janus Bifrons here
as to a 2-open system.
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Fig. 4. The RRvar client connects with both MPlayer and an exemplary user interface.
Fig. 5. Log of the interaction between user and UI. Between 50 and 60s a rapid burst of keystrokes is interpreted as an anomalous situation.
25 and the Patriot-missile defence system show, unacknowledged drifting can be crucial in maximising unjustiﬁed
trust to dangerous levels. On the other hand, a metric evaluating minimal functionality thresholds can minimise
unjustiﬁed mistrust, reducing conﬁdence that the system will choke and eventually fail (antitrust). Early cases of low
true-alarm rate or high false-alarm rate in automation do not need to set constants for future behaviour of the user.
Similarly, criteria to compare intended and current behaviour are essential to allow mechanical assessment of user’s
inability, incompetence or threats. Fidelity and drifting can provide the systematic methodology and quantitative
model to continually evaluate and experiment the system’s vulnerability in the context of its operations, thus making
the dichotomy conditional vs. unconditional trust (faith) working. Trust can be thought of as a measure of conﬁdence
about minimal drifting from ﬁdelity for all the components, and hence that the overall behaviour of the system is
suﬃciently resilient. In the following, we reconstruct the process of ﬁdelity monitoring, trustworthiness evaluation
and operation execution in terms of a MAPE-loop designed for trust, see24. In the architecture presented in Sect. 3, the
Janus assesses the behaviour of the system. This is parametrised in view of reﬂective variables for CPU consumption
and a component’s operations (on the machine side of the system), and for the user interface (on the user’s side).
Mapping of these variables values as raw facts and qualia provides a measure of system’s ﬁdelity:
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Fig. 6. A MAPE-loop for System trustworthiness based on ﬁdelity.
• ΦCPU : [r]CPU → [q]CPU , obtained by the mapping of input values from the top process to pre-selected param-
eters assigned to CPU-consumption behaviour;
• Φcomponent : [r]component → [q]component, obtained by the mapping of input values from the executable’s observable
behaviour to pre-selected parameters assigned to its operations;
• ΦUI : [r]UI → [q]UI , obtained by the mapping of input values from the user’s observable behaviour to pre-
selected parameters assigned to a standard or expected user’s behaviour.
The system’s component monitoring the classes [r]i of raw facts is called the sensor layer; similarly, we use qualia
layer to refer to the component monitoring the classes [q]i of qualia. The combination of the sensory and representative
layers constitutes the Monitoring component within our MAPE-loop. Fidelity is then approximated as the inversely
proportional function of the drifting from appropriate mappingsΦi. We shall refer to the value of user-based mappings
as user-deﬁned ﬁdelity (ΦU); correspondingly, we shall callmachine-deﬁned ﬁdelity (ΦM) the value based on mappings
related to the machine behaviour. For the Janus introduced in Sect. 3,
ΦU = 1/Δ(t)UI (4)
ΦM = 1/ f (Δ(t)CPU ,Δ(t)exec) (5)
where f is some function, weighted according to domain-speciﬁc and user deﬁned parameters. We refer to the set
of values Φ(t) = {ΦU ,ΦM} as the content of our Analysis component, with the global value Φ parametrised by time.
As an example, consider the class of mappings ΦUI , with a value of the sensor layer indicating e.g. quick typing
and a value of the qualia layer returning a distress indication: in this case the ﬁdelity layer reports an high value. As
an example across distinct mappings, assume that the reﬂective variable for MPlayer indicates that the application
is running slower, while the one for CPU monitoring indicates low usage value: this is expressed by a low ﬁdelity
value across the two classes in ΦM . Analysing ﬁdelity values across the distinct monitoring layers allows a cumulative
evaluation to be obtained. This value is monitored by the apperception layer. This layer is used to evaluate system
trustworthiness as a global value of user-deﬁned and machine-deﬁned ﬁdelity values. The next level is represented
by the Janus feeding the content of the apperception layer into the control layer. This corresponds to the Planning
component of our system. At this stage, system trustworthiness is matched to a resilience scale that identiﬁes and
automatically triggers actions aimed at preserving system safety or enabling ameliorating conditions. The latter part
of the system is the Execution component, monitoring an action layer. Despite the fact that a resilience scale should
be highly domain speciﬁc, a possible general model can be given in terms of four essential stages:
1. Trustworthy System identiﬁes high levels of Φ(t), inducing optimal, sustainable working conditions;
2. Unstable System identiﬁes high-to-medium ΦU and low ΦM levels, inducing reconﬁgurable working conditions;
3. Unsafe System identiﬁes high-to-medium ΦM and low ΦU levels, inducing alarm-rising working conditions;
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4. Untrustworthy System identiﬁes low-levels of Φ(t), inducing inadvisable or below-safety working conditions.
The above analysis is summarised in the MAPE-loop in Fig. 6.
5. Conclusions
We have presented a prototypical model architecture for a trust-based MAPE-loop for cyber-physical systems. The
trust evaluation is grounded on the assessment of ﬁdelity drifting with respect to values representing ideal reference
conditions for both user and machine. Although prototypical, we believe that our architecture proves the feasibility
of our approach to trustworthiness assessment and paves the way towards future implementations. Our goal is to
develop systems that are trustworthy in integrating quality-of-service and quality-of-experience, by optimising the
relations between system-level, “microscopic” aspects and user-level, “macroscopic” ones. A further goal is to extend
our architecture into that of a MAPE-K loop and apply machine learning methods such that systems based on our
approach may systematically improve the match with the environments they interact with. Costs analysis for the trust-
based MAPE-loop remains to be explored. Its use at early stages of design can reduce risks; our examples shows,
nonetheless, that it is possible to deploy the methodology on existing software, by selecting relevant variables. Further
work will focus on formal modelling of trustworthiness assessment in a probabilistic epistemic setting.
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